Matters to Consider for the 2018 Annual General Meeting and Proxy Season

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

Every year, reporting issuers are faced with the task of tailoring the disclosure for their annual general meeting ("**AGM**") to ever-evolving securities laws, updates to stock exchanges rules, new guidance from proxy advisors and developing corporate governance trends.

The checklist and overview of certain matters relevant to the 2018 proxy season that follows is intended to help reporting issuers in Canada prepare for their upcoming AGMs by identifying relevant developments in disclosure rules and governance practices over the past year. We have prepared the checklist below to set out very briefly the areas where the Canadian Securities Administrators (the "**CSA**") and the Toronto Stock Exchange (the **"TSX"**) have provided guidance on or updates to their respective disclosure rules, where the major proxy advisors have updated their proxy voting guidelines and where trends or best practices have emerged or evolved, either at the instigation of advocacy groups or otherwise.

Greater detail on the guidance, updates, trends and developments identified in the checklist is available on subsequent pages.

If you have any questions about any of the matters discussed in this publication, please contact any member of our *Corporate Finance & Securities Group*.

I. UPDATES AND GUIDANCE FROM CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATORS

Assess gender diversity practices and disclosure in light of regulatory and investor scrutiny

Gender diversity has been a predominant governance issue this year, with securities regulators releasing the results of their third review of disclosure relating to gender diversity and noting it as an area of focus for the coming year, major proxy advisors enhancing their relevant vote recommendations, and major investors publicly highlighting their own focus. – *For more information, please see page 3*

Ensure cybersecurity defences - and disclosure - are appropriate

The Ontario Securities Commission ("**OSC**") highlighted its continuing interest in the cybersecurity measures adopted by market participants, and the disclosure of risks and defences. – *For more information, please see page 4*

Ensure non-GAAP measures and forward-looking information are robust and compliant

The OSC noted an abundance of inadequate disclosure relating to non-GAAP measures and forward-looking information in its guidance arising from its annual disclosure review. – *For more information, please see page 4*

Monitor social media use to ensure compliance with securities laws

The CSA provided guidance on use of social media by reporting issuers. – *For more information, please see page 5*

Prepare for other developing regulatory priorities

In addition to the matters mentioned above, which were noted specifically by regulators as relevant to the current proxy season, 2017 saw other developments that will likely influence the governance landscape in the coming years, including a possible revision to the definition of "independence" and an ongoing review of the regulatory burden on non-investment fund reporting issuers.

II. UPDATES AND GUIDANCE FROM THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE

Review Majority Voting Policies and Advance Notice Policies or Bylaws
TSX provided recent guidance on listed issuers' majority voting and advance notice policies – *For more information, please see page 6*

Post key governance documents on issuers corporate websites
TSX will now require listed issuers to maintain websites that includes easy public access to certain key corporate governance documents. – *For more information, please see page 7*

Update compensation plan disclosure to comply with enhanced TSX requirements
TSX enhanced the disclosure required for security-based compensation plans, including the disclosure of the "burn rate" for the preceding three years. – *For more information, please see page 7*

III. PROXY ADVISOR VOTING GUIDELINES FOR 2018

Consider the impact of the 2018 proxy guideline updates from major proxy advisors
This year, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. ("**ISS**") and Glass Lewis & Co. ("**Glass Lewis**") both focused on gender diversity and director overboarding. – *For more information, please see page 8*

IV. OTHER POLICIES AND TRENDS

Assess director compensation in light of CCGG recommendations
The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance ("**CCGG**") published a policy relating to director compensation. – *For more information, please see page 9*

Consider the relevance of the nascent "proxy access" trend in Canada
While Canadian corporate statutes already included proxy access for certain shareholders, close votes on proxy access proposals at two major banks in 2017 and a policy published by CCGG suggest growing pressure to decrease the thresholds required for shareholders to nominate directors. – *For more information, please see page 9*

Consider recent trends in shareholder engagement, long-term planning and sustainability
Statements from major investors, regulators and other market participants highlight an emerging trend that focuses on long-term planning and a broadening range of stakeholders, including a rising demand for disclosure of companies' sustainability practices. – *For more information, please see page 9*

The CSA released Staff Notice 58-309 - *Staff Review of Women on Boards and in Executive Officer Positions* in the fall of 2017 summarizing its third annual review of disclosure relating to gender diversity on boards and in executive officer positions. The review covers certain disclosure relating to gender diversity that is required for non-venture issuers under amendments to National Instrument 58-101 - *Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices* ("**NI 58-101**") that came into force in 2015, including (i) the number and percentage of women on boards and in executive officer positions, (ii) policies, targets and processes relating to the appointment of women on boards and in executive officer positions, and (iii) director term limits or other board renewal mechanisms.

After reviewing the disclosure of 660 issuers, the CSA noted disclosure deficiencies in the following five areas, where disclosure was vague, boilerplate or absent completely:

- disclosure of both the number and percentage of women on boards and in executive officer positions is required each year;
- a description of the company's written policy regarding the representation of women on boards, if the company has adopted such a policy, including a clear explanation of how the policy applies to identification of women directors, must be included;
- if an issuer discloses adoption of targets for the representation of women on boards and in executive officer positions, it must also disclose annual and cumulative progress in achieving those targets;
- if an issuer considers the representation of women in its identification and selection process, it must include a description of how it does so; and
- if an issuer discloses adoption of term limits or other mechanisms for board renewal, it must include a description of those limits and mechanisms.

The disclosure rules in NI 58-101 relating to gender diversity are intended to provide transparency to assist investors when making voting and investment decisions. The regulators have emphasized that this objective is most effectively achieved if the disclosure provides a clear description of the corporate governance practices that an issuer has adopted in respect of women, or the issuer's reasons for not adopting such practices. Continued scrutiny of this area of disclosure and governance by the regulators and various other market participants is assured.

As further noted on *page 8*, gender diversity has also been an area of focus for the major proxy advisors and some institutional investors.

Each year, the OSC's Corporate Finance Branch publishes its annual guidance on areas of concern identified during its annual disclosure review and a statement of priorities for the coming year. The following outlines a summary of certain key areas for this year's proxy season.

CyberSecurity

Cybersecurity concerns and other technological threats remain a potentially significant risk for reporting issuers and, particularly in light of recent high-profile breaches, have remained a priority for securities regulators. The OSC has indicated in recent guidance and its most recent statement of priorities that it will continue to monitor and assess cyber-resilience and cyber-readiness of market participants. Accordingly, issuers should continue to monitor their cybersecurity risk profile, develop and maintain appropriate risk management procedures and ensure their disclosure of both risks and breaches is in line with regulatory expectations.

Non-GAAP Financial Measures

The OSC expressed continued concern over the prominence of disclosure given to non-GAAP financial measures, the visibility and clarity of adjustments made and the appropriateness of the adjustments themselves, particularly in the mining, real estate, technology and biotechnology industries.

Issuers are reminded that disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures must be accompanied by the disclosure that is described in detail in Staff Notice 52-306 - *Non-GAAP Financial Measures*. Further, issuers must provide a clear quantitative reconciliation from the non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable GAAP measure presented in its financial statements and present the non-GAAP financial measure on a consistent basis from period to period. The OSC also reminded issuers that non-GAAP financial measures generally should not describe adjustments as non-recurring, infrequent or unusual when a similar loss or gain is reasonably likely to occur within the next two years or occurred during the prior two years.

The OSC intends to continue reviewing disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures, and may take regulatory action if an issuer discloses information in a manner that is considered misleading or otherwise contrary to the public interest.

Forward-Looking Information ("FLI")

The OSC also noted its concern with generic factors and assumptions being disclosed in respect of FLI, as well as assumptions not being quantified. It also noted a common deficiency of issuers failing to update previously disclosed FLI. Disclosure of specific and relevant material factors or assumptions is necessary for investors to understand how actual results may vary from FLI. For investors to assess whether assumptions underlying the FLI are reasonable, issuers should disclose those assumptions both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Where FLI is presented for multiple years and is not sufficiently supported by reasonable assumptions, the OSC may ask issuers to limit disclosure of FLI to a shorter period, for which reasonable support exists.

Mining Disclosure

Issuers that disclose a preliminary economic assessment ("**PEA**") on an advanced property containing mineral reserves are reminded that such disclosure is only permissible when results are disclosed in a manner consistent with the CIM definitions. The OSC is concerned with non-compliant PEAs that incorporate economic analyses, production schedules and cash flow models based on inferred mineral resources into economic studies based on mineral reserves.

The CSA conducted a review of the social media disclosure of 111 reporting issuers to determine whether disclosure was consistent with the principles of National Policy 51-201 - *Disclosure Standards* ("**NB 51-201**") and the requirements of National Instrument 51-102 - *Continuous Disclosure Obligations*. The review covered disclosure on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Instagram and GooglePlus postings, amongst others, as well as disclosure on issuers' own websites, including any message boards or blogs hosted on those websites. The CSA review identified three key areas where issuers are expected to improve their social media disclosure practices:

1. Selective or Early Disclosure on Social Media

When issuers disclose material information, they must ensure that it is "generally disclosed" consistent with the expectations outlined in NP 51-201. Importantly, disclosure of material information on a social media website alone is insufficient to meet the standards of NP 51-201. Issuers must first disclose material information via a news release, in accordance with securities law requirements, before further disseminating the news on any social media website.

More specifically, FLI regarding revenue, earnings per share, cash flow targets and expected timing of future milestones, such as the timing for a new product launch or the amount of time before an asset can begin generating revenue, must be generally disclosed to all stakeholders and must not be selectively posted on social media websites in advance of general disclosure via press release and on SEDAR.

2. Unbalanced or Misleading Disclosure on Social Media

Issuers must avoid exaggerated reports and promotional commentary on social media websites, and all information provided must be factual, balanced and consistent with continuous disclosure on SEDAR. In particular, the CSA considers disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures not previously generally disclosed and not disclosed in regulatory filings to be misleading to investors (in addition to creating a selective disclosure concern). This could occur, for instance, if non-GAAP measures are only disclosed on social media.

When providing copies of reports from independent analysts, issuers should provide the names and/or recommendations of all independent analysts who cover the issuer and avoid selectively disclosing favourable analyst reports only. If issuers post links to analyst reports or other articles, they may be required to update the FLI about the issuer in such reports or articles in the future, as issuers will be deemed to have effectively endorsed any forward-looking targets linked in the reports or articles in their social media posts.

3. Importance of Social Media Governance Policies

The CSA expects issuers to develop rigorous policies and procedures for the use of social media. A strong social media governance policy should include consideration of (i) who can post information about the issuer on social media; (ii) what type of sites (including personal social media accounts vs. corporate) can be used; (iii) what type of information about the issuer (financial, legal, operational, marketing, etc.) can be posted on social media; (iv) what, if any, approvals are required before information can be posted; (v) who is responsible for monitoring the issuer's social media accounts, including third-party postings about the issuer; and (vi) what other guidelines and best practices are followed (for example, if an employee posts about the issuer on a personal social media site they should identify themselves as an employee of the issuer).

Majority Voting Policies

In 2014, the TSX adopted amendments to its Company Manual requiring each director of a TSX-listed issuer to be elected by a majority (50% + one vote) of the votes cast with respect to his or her election, other than at a contested meeting, with certain limited exceptions. To comply with this requirement, since shareholders do not vote "against" directors, but rather must choose to vote "for" or "withhold" from voting, TSX-listed issuers were required to adopt a majority voting policy requiring directors who do not receive a majority of the votes cast to tender their resignation.

Following a review of 200 randomly selected majority voting policies, the TSX identified a number of key deficiencies, largely relating to boards' ability to not accept resignations tendered under a majority voting policy. In particular, the TSX clarified that majority voting policies must require a director to resign immediately if he or she is not elected by a majority of votes cast, must expressly state that the issuer's board will accept the resignation within 90 days, absent exceptional circumstances and must not include provisions that have the effect of circumventing the policy objectives (including a higher quorum requirement for the election of directors compared to the quorum requirement for other resolutions and provisions that treat certain nominees more favourably than other nominees).

Further, the TSX clarified that the "exceptional circumstances" under which a board need not accept a resignation should be interpreted narrowly, and do not include a director's length of service, qualifications, attendance at meetings, experience or contributions to the issuer.

Majority voting policies that are not compliant with the TSX Company Manual, in light of this recent guidance, should be amended as soon as practicable, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the next shareholder meeting.

Advance Notice Policies

The TSX recognizes that many listed issuers have chosen to adopt policies and bylaws prescribing timeframes and procedures to nominate directors ("**Advance Notice Policies**"), and acknowledges that such policies may be legitimately used to preserve security holder interests, provided they do not unreasonably limit the ability of security holders to nominate directors for election.

After reviewing a random selection of Advance Notice Policies, the TSX identified a number of areas that are not consistent with TSX policy objectives, including provisions in Advance Notice Policies requiring that a nominating security holder be present at the meeting at which his or her nominee is standing for election or provide unduly burdensome or unnecessary disclosure that does not relate to the disclosure of the nominating security holder's economic and voting position, or documents, representations, consents or questionnaires that are not required by the issuer from management and board nominees.

The TSX considers the notification periods permitted under the current guidelines published by the major proxy advisors for Canada acceptable for its purposes. Specifically, the following notice periods are consistent with the TSX's director election requirements:

- For an AGM, a notice period ending at least 30 days before the meeting date.
- For an AGM held on a date that is less than 50 days after the first public announcement of the date of the AGM ("**Notice Date**"), a notice period ending at least 10 days following the Notice Date.
- For a special meeting called for the purpose of electing directors (whether or not also called for other purposes), a notice period ending at least 15 days following the Notice Date.

Advance Notice Policies should give the board of directors discretion to waive any provision of the policy or bylaw, and issuers should adopt Advance Notice Policies sufficiently in advance of a shareholder meeting in order to allow security holders to comply with applicable notice periods.

Website Disclosure

The TSX amended its Company Manual in 2017 to adopt new website disclosure requirements. By April 1, 2018, all TSX-listed issuers, subject to certain exceptions, must maintain a website on which the public can access the following documents in a clearly identifiable way:

- articles and bylaws, or equivalent constating documents;
- majority voting policy;
- advance notice policy;
- position descriptions for the chairman of the board and the lead director;
- board mandate; and
- board committee charters.

The TSX believes that the new website disclosure requirements will create value for investors by establishing a centralized location for accessing key corporate governance documents. While certain of the documents identified above must already be disclosed on SEDAR, the TSX was of the view that these documents may be difficult to locate or access.

While the initial list of governance documents proposed by the TSX to be included on company websites was whittled down to those listed above following feedback from market participants, the TSX believes that the enhanced accessibility of these governance documents will outweigh the additional obligations they impose on issuers.

New Compensation Plan Disclosure

In the fall of 2017, the TSX also amended its Company Manual to adopt additional disclosure requirements relating to issuers' security-based compensation arrangements ("**The Plans**"). All TSX-listed issuers must, for financial years ending on or after October 31, 2017, disclose in their management information circular (or other annual disclosure document distributed to all security holders) the annual "burn rate" for each of the issuer's three most recently completed fiscal years for each relevant Plan.

The burn rate for a Plan is calculated by dividing the number of securities granted under the Plan during the applicable fiscal year by the weighted average number of securities outstanding for the applicable fiscal year, and must be expressed as a percentage. If securities awarded under a Plan include a multiplier, the details of the multiplier must also be disclosed.

The TSX clarified that the disclosure requirements relating to a Plan's vesting and term provisions apply to all Plans, not only to stock option plans, and that disclosure must include particulars of the maximum number of awards issuable, the number of outstanding awards and the number of awards available for grant under each Plan.

Board Gender Diversity

- For the 2018 proxy season, ISS will generally recommend a withhold vote for the chair of the nominating committee of an S&P/TSX Composite Index company (or board chair if there is no nominating committee chair) where the company has not disclosed a formal written gender diversity policy *and* has no female directors. This recommendation will apply to all TSX-listed companies for the 2019 proxy season, with limited exceptions for newly listed companies and companies with four or fewer directors. According to ISS, a written gender diversity policy should include measurable goals or targets, demonstrate a clear commitment to increasing gender diversity within a reasonable period of time and avoid boilerplate or contradictory language.

- Glass Lewis will not make recommendations relating to gender diversity for the 2018 proxy season, but, for the 2019 proxy season, it will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee (and possibly other directors) where the company has not adopted a formal written gender diversity policy *or* has no female directors. However, Glass Lewis may not apply its guideline for non-S&P/TSX Composite Index companies if they provide an acceptable rationale or disclose a plan to address the lack of diversity.

Director Over-boarding

- For the 2018 proxy season, ISS will generally recommend a withhold vote for a director who is both "over-boarded" (meaning a non-CEO director who sits on more than four public company boards or a CEO who sits on more than one public company board in addition to the board of the company of which such director is CEO) *and* attended less than 75% of the board and committee meetings in the prior year without a valid reason.

- For the 2019 proxy season, however, ISS's guideline will be updated to generally conform with that of Glass Lewis, which will generally recommend a vote against a non-executive director who sits on more than five public company boards or an executive director who sits on more than two public company boards. Glass Lewis will consider exceptions for executive directors depending on the specific duties and responsibilities as an executive officer.

Other Guidelines

New Director Categories: ISS adopted new categories under its definition of "independence", which it uses to classify the different types of directors. Under the new regime, directors are classified as (i) an Executive Director, (ii) a Non-Independent, Non-Executive Director (including former CEOs, controlling shareholders, non-CEO executives, relatives of executives and persons with professional/financial relationships, among other things), or (iii) an Independent Director.

Pay for Performance Evaluation: ISS added a new test to its quantitative "pay for performance" evaluation framework. The new "relative financial performance assessment test" compares the rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance to a peer group, each measured over a three year period.

Board Responsiveness: Glass Lewis expects that public company boards should respond publicly when over 20% of the votes cast by shareholders are against a company proposal, particularly in regards to director elections (this threshold has been lowered from the previous threshold of 25%). Further, for companies with dual-class share structures, Glass Lewis expects boards to respond publicly when a majority of the unaffiliated shareholders support a shareholder proposal or are against a company proposal.

Virtual Meetings: If a company is holding a virtual-only meeting, Glass Lewis expects its information circular to include disclosure describing how shareholders will be provided with the same rights and opportunities to participate at the virtual-only meeting as they would have otherwise at a traditional meeting. Starting in 2019, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against governance committee members of a company holding a virtual-only meeting if appropriate disclosure is not provided.

While not binding on reporting issuers, advocacy groups representing major institutional investors, such as the CCGG, and other market participants also issue policies and public statements that reflect important governance trends and can be influential for shareholders and reporting issuers. In 2017, the CCGG issued two new policies. Those, along with statements from some institutional investors and a growing trend in shareholder proposals relating to environmental, social and governance matters, are likely to be relevant in the upcoming proxy season.

Proxy Access

In a policy published in November, 2017, the CCGG recommended that shareholders be given a meaningful say in which directors are nominated for election. Specifically, the CCGG recommends requiring that a shareholder (or group of shareholders) that has held at least 3% of the outstanding shares for at least three years be permitted to nominate directors, capped at the greater of two directors or 20% of the board. According to the policy, disclosure about the shareholder's nominees should be set out in the company's information circular equally with the disclosure about management's nominees, and the nominees should be included on the company's form of proxy. The CCGG also recommends that shareholders be allowed to use the company's information circular to solicit support for nominees, recognizing that this particular recommendation requires a change to existing securities laws.

The CCGG policy was issued following close votes on shareholder proposals at the AGMs of two major Canadian banks in 2017 that sought this lower threshold form of proxy access for shareholders.

Director Compensation

The CCGG also published a policy in October, 2017 setting out five principles for director compensation. In particular, the CCGG recommends that director compensation be designed to (i) encourage objectivity and independent thinking, and promote alignment with the long term interests of the corporation, its shareholders and other stakeholders; (ii) reflect the required expertise and time commitment; (iii) be no different for directors performing similar roles; (iv) include a component that promotes shareholding by directors; and, (v) minimize complexity and ensure transparency, so as to be well understood by directors and shareholders alike. The CCGG recommends that equity-based compensation consist of full value awards, such as Deferred Stock Units, rather than awards based on corporate performance, such as stock options.

Investor Focus on Long-Term Planning, Engagement and Sustainability

In Canada, as well as globally, investors and regulators increased their focus on environmental, social and governance ("**ESG**") practices and disclosure, including relating to shareholder engagement, long-term planning and sustainability. In particular, some major institutional investors are undertaking efforts to integrate long-termism and sustainability considerations into their investment decisions. For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, Inc., in his recently published annual letter to CEOs, focused on long-term planning and a broad range of stakeholder interests, and the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan considers the impact of climate change as part of its risk management framework. In addition, there has been a marked increase in shareholder proposals relating to ESG matters in Canada and elsewhere. From a regulatory perspective, the CSA has indicated its interest in rules governing climate disclosure.

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